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NOTE

INGLE V. GLAMORE MOTOR SALES, INC.:
THE BATTLE BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND
EMPLOYMENT IN THE CLOSE
CORPORATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Labor is defined as "work, toil, service, mental or physical exertion."' However, this definition fails to reveal the essential role labor
plays in our society.2 Labor is the means by which we define our3
selves, our ethics, morals, successes, and failures. Nonetheless, it is
our labor, the source of our livelihood, that has become endangered
in our present society.
As a nation of employees, we have become dependent upon
others for our livelihood.4 The individual worker is relatively immoI. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 786 (5th ed. 1979). Although the term labor "normally
refers to work for wages," rather than "work for profits," it "is sometimes construed to mean
service rendered or part played in production of wealth." Id.
2. "Employment is more than a source of income." Cox, BOK, & GORMAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 1 (10th ed. 1986). "One's sense of worth and of accomplishment
is shaped largely by one's workplace responsibilities, performance, and rewards." Id.
3.

E.H. PHELPS BROWN, THE EcONOMICS OF LABOR 9 (1962). Work is the key to mem-

bership in a society. Id. An individual's labor provides the means to live in the society as a
productive participant. Id.
4. F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951). As our society's economic emphasis changed from an agricultural to an industrial state, the individual workers lost their
freedom of expression and ability to be self-autonomous, and thus lost the control over their
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bile and has become "highly vulnerable to private economic powers." 5 "For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's
hands." 6
One response to the threats facing the individual workers and
their job security has been the creation and protection of the labor
organization through the development of the National Labor Relations Act. 7 Through collective bargaining, individual workers gain
economic power which affords them some control over their labor
and therefore their livelihood.8 "But while unions have done much to
correct the imbalance between employers and employees, the assumption that they stand as the universal protectors of all employees

at every echelon of employment would be an obvious and gross exaggeration." 9 Many workers are not afforded protection under the National Labor Relations Act, nor do they have sufficient bargaining
strength to adequately ensure their means of survival. 10 This is the
plight of the employee at-will."
A.

EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL

Many commentators emphasize that "[e]mployment at-will has
long been a major tenet of American contract law.' 2 It is understood that "[u]nder the traditional concept of employment at-will, a
worker can quit or be fired [at any time and for any reason] without
explanation."'"
Approximately sixty-percent of the American
workforce is governed by the doctrine of employment at-will which
livelihood. Cox, BOK, GORMAN, supra note 2, at 11.
5. J. K. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISm 114 (2d ed. 1956). For many
individual
workers the notions of capitalism and free enterprise are a farce set up by employers
who can
achieve these economic goals. Id.
6. F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (emphasis omitted).
7. Cox, BOK, & GORMAN, supra note 2, at 8.
8. Kaynard, Deregulation & Labour Law in the United States, 6 HOFSTRA LAB.
LJ. 2
(1988). In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act to address
the disparity
between the bargaining power of the individual workers and employers through
direct intervention and regulation. Id.
9. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1410 (1967).
10. GALBRAITH, supra note 5, at 114.
11. The doctrine of employment at-will allows either party to terminate the employment
relationship at any time, for any reason or for no reason at all. Novosel v. Nationwide
Ins. Co.,
721 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir. 1983).
12. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 902 (3d Cir. 1983). See 9
WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 1017 (3d ed. 1967); 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 684 (1960 & Supp.
1971).
13. Wall St. J., August 1, 1989, at Al, col. 3. See Novosel, 721 F.2d at 898; Murphy
v.
American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 305, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d
232, 237
(1983).
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provides no job security for the individual workers and usurps any
control they have over their livelihood. 14
This Comment addresses the various applications of the employ15
ment at-will doctrine as it is applied to the minority shareholder in
6 . The strict application of the employment atthe close corporation
will doctrine to the minority shareholder of a close corporation
places the minority shareholder in a precarious position because the
potential for abuse by the majority or controlling shareholders is
great. " In light of the minority shareholders' weaker bargaining position, these "owners face the potential of complete loss of liquidity
of their investment and an indefinite exclusion from profit
sharing. '"18
This Comment focuses on a New York case, Ingle v. Glamore
Motor Sales, Inc.,'1 in which the New York Court of Appeals
strictly adhered to the rigid employment at-will doctrine rather than
carve out an exception to this doctrine. New York's employment at20
will doctrine is referred to as "Wood's Rule" and provides that
"under New York law as it now stands, absent a constitutionally
14. See Novosel, 721 F.2d at 902. The New York workforce is representative of the
American workforce, for it has approximately the same number of employees governed by the
employment at-will doctrine. See Minda, The Common Law of Employment At-Will in New
York: The Paralysisof Nineteenth Century Doctrine,36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939 (1982). However, the New York workforce faces special problems resulting from the lack of adequate
protection in the close corporation. See text infra.
15. A minority shareholder is an owner of a non-controlling interest in a corporation's
stock. Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 183, 535 N.E.2d 1311, 538 N.Y.S.2d
771 (1989).
16. A close corporation is analogous to the closely held corporation and/or the private
company. Afterman, Statutory Protectionfor Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for
Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (1969). In essence, it is a business enterprise usually
operated in a fashion similar to the sole proprietorship, in that there is no division between
management and ownership, but it is incorporated to limit potential liability. Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 584, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975).
17. Comment, The Strict Good Faith Standard-FiduciaryDuties to Minority Shareholders in Close Corporations, 33 MERCER L. REV. 595, 596 (1982).
18. Comment, supra note 17, at 596; see Heatherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close CorporationProblem, 63
VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977).
19.

73 N.Y.2d 183, 535 N.E.2d 1311, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1989).

20. Minda, supra note 14, at 939. Some commentators assert that the doctrine of employment at-will was created from Wood's treatise on master and servant law which provoked
the courts to abandon the former English rule that "in the absence of an agreement, a term of
employment was presumed to be for a period of one year." Bierman & Youngblood, Employment at Will and the South CarolinaExperiment, 7 INDus. REL. L.J. 28, 29 (1984); see also
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118
(1976). "[I]t is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party." H. Wood,
THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 134 (1877).
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impermissible purpose, 21 a statutory proscription, 22 or an express
limitation in the individual contract of employment,23 an employer's
right at any time to terminate an employment at-will remains
unimpaired." 24
Although this unconditional rule resembles the law of master
and servant of early sixteenth century England, 5 the doctrine of employment at-will was not intended to be oppressive towards the individual worker. 26 However, oppression has been the result because the
"individual employee in the modern work force [does] not have the
bargaining power to negotiate"2 7 with the employer. To compensate
for the injustices which result from the inequality of bargaining
power, many courts outside of New York have been compelled to
make exceptions to the doctrine of employment at-will to meet the
21. As stated in Novosel, the opinion that "'there occurs an express or implied waiver
or relinquishment of otherwise valid constitutional rights when an employee voluntarily engages in employment . . .' must consequently be rejected as a ruling that 'simply persists from
blind imitation of the past.'" Novosel, 721 F.2d at 898 (quoting HOLMES, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)). In the absence of a contractual relationship, employees have not been afforded protection under theories of common law nor constitutional
law. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 68 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). In The Slaughterhouse
Cases, the Supreme Court denied employees access to constitutional protection over their
rights in the workplace by narrowly construing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
22. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Supreme Court upheld a statutory
exception to the Doctrine of Employment At-Will, even though it interfered with the principles
of freedom of contracting. 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937). This exception was created under the National Labor Relations Act and was permissible because it did not prohibit the right of an
employer to discharge an employee but rather infringed upon the employer's ability to use the
doctrine as a "means of intimidation and coercion." Id.
23. In Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., the court followed the principles of Weiner v. McGraw-Hill Inc. and held that "on an appropriate evidentiary showing, a limitation on
the employer's right to terminate an employment [relationship] of indefinite duration might
be
imported from an express provision . . . found in the employer's handbook on personnel policies and procedures." Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 305, 448
N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Weiner v. McGraw-Hill Inc.,
57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982)). However, it is interesting to note
that in both cases, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the plaintiff's
assertion of an express limitation. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 305, 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461
N.Y.S.2d at 237.
24. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 305, 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
25. Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 462, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195. Wood explained, "[w]ith us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to

establish it by proof." H.

WOOD, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT

134 (1877).

26. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333, 506 N.E.2d 919, 921, 514
N.Y.S.2d 209, 211 (1987). The employment at-will doctrine was intended to balance employees' rights to contract for their personal interests against employers' rights to exercise their
business judgment in employment practices. Id.
27. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
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new climate of the employer-employee relationship.2"

B.

The Close Corporation Conflict

The controversy present in Ingle v. Glamore Motors Sales,
involves the employment rights of the minority shareholder in

Inc.19

the close corporation.30 The investors in the close corporation do not

intend to be passive; they want to take an active role in the manage-

ment and participate in its operations. 31 Thus, the non-controlling

shareholders' interest, unlike the investors in a public corporation, is

tied to their employment.3 2 Because the close corporation lies some33
where between the publicly-held corporation and the partnership,

some states have made exceptions to the strict doctrine of employ-

ment at-will by imposing certain duties and responsibilities upon the
actors of the close corporation. The purpose of these exceptions is to

prevent oppression and to compensate the parties for the injuries
28. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 132, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974). Since
the 1930's and continuing through the present, the law has been prompted by "political, scholarly, and industrial" pressure "to provide [for] greater job security." Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at
463, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
29. 73 N.Y.2d 183, 535 N.E.2d 1311, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1989).
30. Defining a close corporation can be quite troublesome because "[t]here is no single,
generally accepted definition." Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass.
578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975). "Some authorities emphasize the number of shareholders,
some the presence of owner-management, some the lack of a market for the corporation's
stock, and some the existence of formal restrictions on the transferability of the corporation's

shares."

CAREY

& EISENBERG,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS

329 (6th ed. 1988).

The close corporation has been defined as "one in which the stock is held in a few hands, or in
a few families, and wherein it is not at all, or rarely, dealt in buying or selling." Galler v.
Galler, 32 III. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1965). The Massachusetts courts have deemed
"a close corporation to be typified by: (1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market
for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation." Donahue, 367 Mass. at 578, 328 N.E.2d at
511. These characteristics, which provide a useful basis for defining the close corporation, are
also the root of the problems facing the courts and society as the close corporation becomes
engaged in business disputes.
31. Afterman, Statutory Protectionfor OppressedMinority Shareholders:A Model for
Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1064 (1969).
32. Id.
33. Many commentators and courts have viewed the close corporation as a partnership
disguised in a corporation's cloak. Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442,
447, 98 N.E.2d 855, 856 (1912). This form of business organization takes the "benefits peculiar to a corporation, limited liability, perpetuity and the like." In the Matter of Surchin v.
Approved Bus. Mach. Co., 55 Misc. 2d 888, 889, 286 N.Y.S.2d 580, 581 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
However, there is still some sentiment that close corporations are "really partnerships, between
two or three people who contribute their capital, skills, experience and labor." Kruger v.
Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 805, 210 N.E.2d 355, 356, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3, (1965) (Desmond, C.J.,
dissenting).
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which result from their special circumstances. 4
As our society grows, and business ventures become more complex, our lives become more dependent upon rules and doctrines to
protect ourselves and our interests. The notion of limited liability
under the corporate structure developed as a means to limit the individual's investment and to shield personal assets from unsuccessful
business ventures.3 5 This protective structure became widely used
and subsequently spread through our institutions from the largest
manufacturers to the smallest "mom and pop" stores. However, the
corporate structure had to be modified for the small business person
to be able to take advantage of its benefits, hence the development of
the close corporation. Under this variation of the corporate form, the
parties were able to have limited liability and still own and operate
the business in a manner similar to a sole proprietorship or
partnership.
Unfortunately, the rigid applications of these doctrines, without
the benefit of exceptions, can result in the oppression of others. 3
Such conflicts develop within the close corporation when minority
shareholders have different expectations than the majority shareholders.3 7 Because management, employment, and ownership become
intermingled in the close corporation, the minority shareholder becomes dependent upon the majority shareholder or shareholders for
34.

In 1983, 29 states had already recognized some form of exception to the employment

at-will doctrine. Novosel, 721 F.2d at 896. By 1980, 13 jurisdictions allowed a tort claim for
wrongful discharge when termination under the employment at-will doctrine violated
public

policy. Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 825 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). See Novosel,
721 F.2d at 894; Petermann v. International Bhd of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 344
P.2d 25 (1959); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385
(1979);

Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Trombetta v.
Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W,2d 385 (1978); Reuther
v.

Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978). Other courts have recognized an implied duty of good faith upon the employer to not terminate the employment relationship without just cause. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass.

578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579,
292
N.W.2d 880 (1978); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
35. CARY & EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATION 91 (6th
ed. 1988).
36. The employment at-will doctrine was intended to allow the parties the freedom
to

bargain and negotiate contract terms, not to allow employees to terminate employment rela-

tionships and take advantage of their fiduciary position. Zimmer v. Wells Management
Co.,
348 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Amstrong Co., 263 N.Y.
79,
87, 188 N.E.163, 167 (1933). Even New York courts recognize that at-will employees
owe a

duty to deal fairly and in good faith. E.W. Bruno Co. v. Friedberg, 21 A.D.2d 396, 250
N.Y.S.2d 187 (1st Dept. 1964).

37.

Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976);

Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 183, 535 N.E.2d 1311, 538 N.Y.S.2d
771
(1989).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss1/5

6

Ferraro: Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc.: The Battle Between Ownership

19901

Ingle v. Glamore Motor

employment as a means of recouping the investment and providing a
salary."a

For a minority shareholder, "[a] guarantee of employment with
the [close] corporation may have been one of the 'basic reason[s]

why a minority owner has invested capital in the firm.'

"

Unlike

the investor in the publicly held corporation, the investor in the close

corporation normally places a "substantial percentage of his personal
assets in the organization." 40 The minority shareholder does not
guard against corporate risks through diversification, as does the in-

vestor in the publicly held corporation. 1 Therefore, the minority
shareholder normally takes "an active interest in the day-to-day operation of the business and expect[s] it to be a principal source of
' As minority shareholders become personally and
[his] livelihood." 42
financially entrenched in the corporation, they become vulnerable to
the wishes of the majority shareholders and are afforded relatively
little career and investment protection.4 a This is the controversy

which erupts in Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc.44
II.

INGLE

v. GLAMORE MOTOR SALES, INC.

In 1964, Phillip Ingle approached James Glamore, then the sole
shareholder of Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., a close corporation doing
business as a Ford dealership, to acquire an equity interest in the
corporation.45 Glamore declined Ingle's offer to invest in the enter38. See Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 842, 353 N.E.2d at 657.
39. Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 846, 353 N.E.2d at 662. In Wilkes, the court imposed a duty
of good faith and loyalty upon the controlling shareholders with regard to the minority shareholder. Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 853, 353 N.E.2d at 664. This fiduciary duty was extended to
prevent the majority from terminating the minority shareholder/employee's employment relationship, even in the absence of an employment contract setting forth the duration of the relationship, on a whim or without cause. Id.
40. Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 514. See Comment, The Strict Good
Faith Standard-FiduciaryDuties to Minority Shareholders in Close Corporation, 33 MERCER L. REV. 595 (1982)(discussing the differences between the expectations held by shareholders in a publicly held corporation in comparison to the shareholders of a close corporation).
41. Comment, supra note 40, at 595.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 73 N.Y.2d 183, 535 N.E.2d 1311, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1989).
45. 73 N.Y.2d at 186, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772. Based on the fact that
Ingle initially wanted to purchase stock in Glamore Motor Sales, Inc. but instead agreed to
take a position of employment in the corporation when his offer was refused, we can infer that
Ingle intended to use his position as a shareholder as a means of building a working relationship with Glamore, the controlling shareholder. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 197, 535 N.E.2d at 1319,
538 N.Y.S.2d at 779. If Ingle's desire were merely to invest his funds into a corporate entity,
he certainly would have looked to a publicly held corporation. Id.
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prise but instead hired Ingle as a sales manager.4" "There was no
express agreement between the parties establishing either the duration or conditions of employment. 47
Two years later, James Glamore offered Ingle the opportunity
to purchase 22 out of Glamore's 100 shares, with an option to buy
18 more shares over a five-year period.4 8 Ingle accepted and from
1973 through 1982 Ingle owned forty percent of the corporation.49
Upon the acquisition of corporate stock, Ingle was "nominated" and
"voted" into the positions of director and secretary of the corporation by Glamore.50 Ingle continued his employment but now as a codealer with "full managerial authority and responsibility for the operating management."'' 1 This relationship stemmed from the agreement between Glamore and Ingle, as the two shareholders of the
dealership, and Ford.5 2 From 1966 until his termination, Ingle was
active in the management and the day-to-day operations of the dealership.53 He held various offices including Vice President, and he
personally guaranteed corporate loans. 4
In 1982, Glamore Motor Sales, Inc. issued sixty new shares of
stock which were purchased by Glamore and his two sons.? As a
result, Ingle's equity interest in the corporation decreased from forty
to twenty-five percent.5 6 Within a year-and-a-half, Ingle, then owning twenty-five percent of the corporation's stock, was ousted from
his corporate positions and was terminated from his employment relationship with the corporation by Glamore and his two sons. 17
Although Ingle and Glamore never entered into a formal em46.

Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 186, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

51.

Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 193, 535 N.E.2d at 1316, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (Hancock, J.,

dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 186, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772. James Glamore
purchased 22 shares of the corporation and his two sons bought 19 shares each. Id. The court
did not address whether Ingle had the opportunity to purchase the newly issued shares of

stock, but from the history of Ingle's prior acquisitions of stock, it appears that he would have
purchased stock if Glamore had permitted such an arrangement. Id.

56. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 193, 535 N.E.2d at 1316, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (Hancock, J.,

dissenting).

57. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 186, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772. Ingle alleges
that Glamore and his sons terminated his employment relationship with the corporation for the
sole purpose of recapturing his stock for their personal gain. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 193, 535
N.E.2d at 1316, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
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ployment contract, other aspects of their business relationship, in-

cluding Ingle's purchase of stock and placement into corporate posts
of director and secretary, were governed by a shareholders agreement.5 8 The agreement included a provision which granted Glamore
thirty days to repurchase the stock owned by a shareholder who
"shall cease to be an employee of the Corporation for any reason.1 59
Within thirty days after Ingle's termination, Ingle was informed
that Glamore would exercise his repurchase upon termination op-

tion"0 and in return Ingle would receive 96,000 dollars for his forty
shares in Glamore Motor Sales, Inc. 1 As emphasized in the majority opinion, Ingle accepted the payment and did not dispute the buyback price.6 2 However, to view this case as an attempt by the plain58. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 187, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
59. Id. Historically, restrictions on a shareholder's ability to transfer corporate shares
were seen as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d
534, 141 N.E.2d 418, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957). Today, courts are willing to uphold various
constraints including "first refusals," "first options," and "consent restraints." See CAREY &
EISENBERG, supra note 30, at 421 (6th ed. 1988). The consent restraints on share transfers
have been seen as the most restrictive of the three basic forms and have been held as an illegal
restraint on alienation of personal property. Id. at 422. In Rafe v. Hindin, a provision which
disallowed transfers of corporate stock to individuals other than present shareholders was
viewed as an arbitrary award of power to the purchasing shareholders, thus unreasonable and
void as it was contrary to public policy. 29 A.D.2d 481, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662 (App. Div. 1968).
At first glance, one would assume a buy-back provision, similar to clause 7(b) of the
shareholders agreement present in Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., would also be held by
the New York courts to be violative of public policy. However, the New York Court of Appeals has not extended this type of protection to minority shareholders under repurchase agreements. See Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418
(1957). In Allen, the court held that it was not the restriction on transferability but the prohibition against transfers that made the provisions unlawful. Id. The Allen case is distinguished
from Ingle in that the former had made a choice to sell the corporate stock, whereas Ingle had
the sale forced upon him.
60. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 187, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772. A buy-back
right enables a corporation to repurchase the shareholder's stock when an event explicitly expressed in the agreement occurs. CAREY & EiSENBERG, supra note 30, at 423. The corporation's right is not subject to the wishes of the shareholder, and it occurs automatically even if
the shareholder wants to retain the stock. Id. The rationale for allowing a repurchase agreement upon termination, death or the occurrence of another named event rests upon the similarities between the close corporation and the partnership structure. Id. at 421. Because the
shareholders of the close corporation, like partners in a partnership, are interdependent upon
each other in the daily operations of the business, there is a need to maintain a balance of
control and to be able to veto the admission of a new colleague. Id. This type of special protection for the remaining shareholders is appropriate when a shareholder dies or chooses to terminate his business relationship, but it is not a proper exercise of power when a shareholder is
terminated arbitrarily, without cause, and for the remaining shareholders' personal gain. Ingle,
73 N.Y.2d at 193, 535 N.E.2d at 1316, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (Hancock, J.,dissenting).
61. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 186, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772. The terms of
the buy-back provision were set forth in the shareholder's agreement and included the repurchase price. Id.
62. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 189, 535 N.E.2d at 1314, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
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tiff, to obtain a higher profit margin on his investment, is to completely misunderstand the purpose and intent of Ingle's complaint
and the special circumstances surrounding the close corporation.63

Ingle wanted to recover his shares and reinstate his employment
relationship as a form of redress or compensation for the injury of
"being involuntarily cashed out as a stockholder through the buyback agreement and forced out of his investment and participation in
' Ingle
Glamore Motor Sales, Inc."64
was granted an appeal by the
New York Court of Appeals after an unsuccessful attempt to thwart
the dismissal of his claims pursuant to the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. 65 Ingle alleged the following causes of action:
(1) breach of contract,66 (2) breach of fiduciary duties, 67 and (3)
tortious interference with a contract.6 8
In a motion for summary judgment, the New York Court of
Appeals and the lower New York courts rejected Ingle's arguments
that shareholders of close corporations should be treated as partners
with special duties of good faith and loyalty. 9 The court held that
Ingle's employment relationship should be governed by the employ-

ment at-will doctrine and not be afforded any special treatment

under tort or contract law.70
A.

The Shareholder's Agreement: Provision 7(b)

In 1964, when Ingle was hired as sales manager, "[t]here was
no express agreement between the parties establishing either the duration or conditions of employment.' In 1966, the parties entered
63. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 193, 535 N.E.2d at 1315, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 776 n.1 (Hancock,
J., dissenting).
64. Id. As stated by Justice Hancock in his dissenting opinion, Ingle would have cause to
dispute the buy-back price when one considers that Ingle initially invested $75,000 approximately 17 years earlier and personally guaranteed up to $100,000 of the corporation's loans
to
receive $96,000 for approximately twenty years of service, a profit of $19,000. Id.
65. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 190, 535 N.E.2d at 1314, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
66. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 188, 535 N.E.2d at 1314, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 773. Ingle asserted
his contention that the defendants breached an implied covenant under the shareholder's
agreement to dismiss for cause only. Id.
67. Id. Ingle alleges that the special needs and circumstances surrounding the close corporation and its shareholders compel the imposition of fiduciary duties of loyalty and good
faith akin to the duties imposed upon the actors operating under a partnership agreement.
Id.
68. Id. Ingle's allegation of tortious interference with the employment relationship extends from the defendants "wrongfully inducing the corporation to terminate [the] plaintiff
[who was] an officer, director and employee." Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 199, 535 N.E.2d at 1315,
538 N.Y.S.2d at 775 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
69. 73 N.Y.2d at 190, 535 N.E.2d at 1314, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
70. Id.
71. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 186, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772. Ingle initially
approached Glamore with the intent of purchasing an equity interest in the company but
was
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into a shareholder's agreement which was intended to primarily govern Ingle's purchase of stock and position in corporate posts. 72 When
Ingle purchased the shares, he became a co-dealer with Glamore of
Glamore Motor Sales, "under an agreement with Ford in which
Glamore Motor Sales acknowledges that [Ingle] 'substantially participate[s] in the ownership' of the corporation and has 'full managerial authority and responsibility for the operating management.' 73
When the corporation issued the new shares of stock in 1982,
the shareholders' agreement, including the repurchase option which
was present in the prior agreements, was signed by all four shareholders. 74 The relevant provision states: "(b) Termination of employment. In the event that any Stockholder shall cease to be an employee of the Corporationfor any reason, Glamore shall have the
option, for a period of 30 days after such termination of employall of the shares of stock then owned by such
ment, to purchase
1 75
Stockholder.
The majority of the Court "adopted [the] defendants' literal interpretation of phrase 7(b) of the stockholders' agreement [stating
that the clause] to 'cease to be an employee of the Corporation for
any reason' [gave the] defendants the unfettered right to repurchase
plaintiff's shares by firing him, even if arbitrarily or in bad faith. 76
However, as noted in the dissenting opinion, the repurchase agreement was not perfectly clear and was not free of ambiguity.7
"The plain wording of the buy-back provision and its sense,
when read in the context of the entire agreement and the circumdenied the stock and hired as a manager. Id. By interpreting the undisputed facts that Ingle

"became [the] sales manager of Glamore Motor Sales in 1964 and later a co-owner of the
business as a means of achieving his objective of becoming a franchised Ford dealer," one can
presume that Ingle's intention in buying the shares was to get knowledge and experience in a
Ford dealership and that he understood that a relationship of employment in the corporation
would be tied to the ownership of the corporation. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 193, 535 N.E.2d at

1316, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
72. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 187, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772. The agreement
included the repurchase option. Id. The 1973 shareholder's agreement was identical to the
1966 agreement at least to the extent of provision 7(b), which gave Glamore the right to buy

back Ingle's shares if "Ingle shall cease to be an employee of the Corporation for any reason."
Id.
73. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 193, 535 N.E.2d at 1316, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
74. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 187, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772.

75. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 187, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772 (emphasis supplied). The prior buy-back agreements contained the same information except that it applied
only to Ingle. Id.
76. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 193, 535 N.E.2d at 1317, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (Hancock, J.,

dissenting).
77. id.
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stances surrounding its execution, by no means unequivocally supports [Ingle's] interpretation.""8 Ingle contends that "the purpose
and intent of paragraph 7(b) was to protect James Glamore in case
the plaintiff chose to leave the business, not to give Glamore the
right, at any time, for any reason or for no reason, to deprive plaintiff of all expectancies as co-principal in the agency.""
In addition, the provision specifically states "if a shareholder
shall cease to be an employee, "80 rather than if a shareholder's employment relationship is terminated."' The plain meaning of these
words supports Ingle's assertion that Glamore intended to protect
himself and his corporation from outside influences in the event that
Ingle left the employment of the corporation, 2 rather than to permit

Glamore, the majority shareholder, to terminate Ingle's employment

relationship with the corporation, as a means to usurp the minority

shareholder's corporate stock and thus his investment.8 3
This provision is intended to govern when the majority shareholders may repurchase corporate stock, not to be a poor substitute
for an at-will employment contract.8 4 "Contrary to what the majority claims the agreement 'expressly confirms,' this contractual provi78. Id. The uncertainty of the attending circumstances included Ingle's sworn statements that "the agreement was not intended to authorize James Glamore to terminate the
business relationship on a whim without cause in order to force a buy-out of [Ingle's] interest."
Id. The minority asserts that the appropriate standard of review of these allegations "must be
read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff [to be] consistent with the rule that in opposing
motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and motions for summary judgment the
plaintiff's submissions must be accepted as true." Id.
79. Id. (emphasis in original). As support for his contentions, Ingle points to two other
provisions which gave Glamore the right to repurchase the shares. Id. Glamore retained the
right to buy-back a shareholder's stock in the event that a shareholder wishes to sell under
paragraph 7(a) and upon a shareholder's death under paragraph 7(c). Id. Ingle asserts that
clause 7(b) is provided to protect Glamore against contingencies out of his control as in
paragraphs 7(a) and (c). Id. Under this interpretation, 7(b) was included in the event that a
shareholder voluntarily left the employment of the corporation. Id.
80. Ingle, 73 N.E.2d at 186, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772 (emphasis in
original).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 194, 535 N.E.2d at 1317, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting). It is appropriate for the majority shareholders in a close corporation to make holding shares in the corporation contingent upon the individual's continued employment. Kruger,
16 N.Y.2d at 805, 210 N.E.2d at 356, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 3 (Desmond, C.J., dissenting). The tie
between the individual's ownership and employment results from the inherent structure of the
close corporation as a combination of a corporation and a partnership. Ripin, 205 N.Y. at 447,
98 N.E.2d at 856.
83. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 194, 535 N.E.2d at 1317, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
84. Ingle, 73 N.E.2d at 195, 535 N.E.2d at 1318, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 778 (dissenting
opinion).
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sion clearly says nothing about the conditions under which the cor-

poration may terminate plaintiffs employment."85 The court should
have examined the expectations and circumstances surrounding the

agreement in order to give meaning to what is otherwise an ambiguous clause.
III.

CURRENT STATUS OF

NEW YORK LAW

While other states are making exceptions to the outdated, rigid
law known as the doctrine of employment at-will, New York continues to refuse to disrupt the status quo. Although there has been some
indication that the New York courts would eventually recognize
such an exception,8" the New York courts continue to place the bur-

den of reform upon the legislature.87 However, the New York courts
are of the opinion that "[i]f the rule of nonliability for termination
of at-will employment is to be tempered, it should be accomplished
through a principled statutory scheme, adopted after opportunity for
public ventilation, rather than in consequence of judicial resolution
of the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants."88

85. Id. (emphasis in original). The majority contends that "[d]ivestiture of his status as
a shareholder, by operation of the repurchase provision, is a contractually agreed to consequence flowing directly from the firing, not vice versa." Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 189, 535 N.E.2d
at 1314, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 774. As stated in the dissenting opinion, the majority supports its
ruling by citing cases in which the employees through negotiations had bargained for other
benefits in exchange for having their employment relationship governed by the doctrine of
employment at-will. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 195, 535 N.E.2d at 1318, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 778. In
Coleman v. Taub, where the parties bargained for the at-will employment status and the repurchase agreement expressly stated that the corporation had the right to "buy-back" the
plaintiff's stock upon "termination of his employment," the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment because it found triable issues of fact. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 196,
535 N.E.2d at 1318, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 778 n.2 (discussing the majority's application of Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981)).
86. See Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussing
Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y. Co. 1978),
affd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dept. 1979)). The court in Savodnik explained
that the motion to dismiss in Chin was granted -because the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof, "not because the New York Supreme Court was unwilling to embrace the theory
of abusive discharge." See Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 826 (discussing Chin, 96 Misc. 2d at
1079, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741; see also Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443
N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (discussing the potential to overcome the doctrine of
employment at-will under the theory that the doctrine stands as a rebuttable presumption in
the absence of a contract setting a fixed term of employment).
87. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 303, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235. In Murphy,
the court, when urged by the plaintiff to make an exception to the rigid employment at-will
doctrine, declined the invitation, being of the opinion that such a significant change in the law
is best left to the legislature because the issue of creating an exception to the employment atwill doctrine is embedded in "the perception and declaration of relevant public policy." Id.
88. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
The Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to discern the
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Unfortunately, the legislature has done little to remedy this situation and "New York's common law of employment at-will has
been placed in a 'legislative deep freeze.' "89 In 1982, the court in
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,Inc.90 suggested that in the absence of legislative action, the court may act on its own to update its employment
at-will doctrine to meet the present day socio-economic needs.9 1 Yet,
the New York courts have continuously acted in a fashion that narrows the holding in the Weiner decision and keeps New York's employment at-will doctrine entrenched in the past.9 2 In deciding
whether to disrupt the status quo, it may be useful to remember the
words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.:

It is revolting to have no better reason for
a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to elicit the views of
the various segments of the community that would be directly affected and in any
event critically interested, and to investigate and anticipate the impact of imposition
of such liability.
Id.

89. Minda, supra note 14, at 944 (citing R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 82
(1969)). Keeton describes a legislative deep freeze as:
A court's refusal to acknowledge its inevitably creative role in statutory interpretation is unrealistic and crippling even in the disposition of a single case. From a long
range point of view, such refusal freezes reform. When legislatures intrude into an
area of private law, the court considers itself no longer free either to overrule or to
innovate interstitially. In view of the ever increasing impact of inertia in legislatures,
the effect in most cases is a deep freeze.
Minda, supra note 14, at 944 n.16 (citing R.

KEETON, VENTURING

To Do

JUSTICE

82

(1969)).
In New York, legislative deep freeze has been the result of a catch-22. The New
York Court of Appeals has refused to alter the common law rule of employment atwill on legislative supremacy grounds, even though the rule was created by the judiciary and is presumably subject to judicial alteration. The Legislature, on the other
hand, is unlikely to enact general unjust dismissal legislation because there is no
lobby to promote new legislation or counteract the opposition of other interest
groups.
Minda, supra note 14, at 944 n.16.
90. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
91. Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 462-63, 443 N.E.2d at 443-44, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195-96.
92. See O'Connor v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 65 N.Y.2d 724, 481 N.E.2d 549, 492
N.Y.S.2d 9 (1985); Rizzo v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 109 A.D.2d 639, 486 N.Y.S.2d
220 (1st Dept. 1985); Wexler v. Newsweek, Inc., 109 A.D.2d 714, 48 7 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1st
Dept. 1985); Citera v. Chemical Bank, 105 A.D.2d 636, 481 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1st Dept, 1984);
Hager v. Union Carbide Corp., 106 A.D.2d 348, 483 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Ist Dept. 1984); Murphy
v. American Home Prod., Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
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from blind imitation of the past."
IV.

METHODS FOR CHANGE

There have been three principle methods that other state courts
have employed in an attempt to neutralize the negative effects of the

employment at-will doctrine. The first method has been a judicially-

94
created exception to the doctrine based on notions of public policy.

In extreme cases, some courts, under a public policy exception, have
imposed a duty of good faith and loyalty upon the parties in all em-

ployment relationships, similar to the fiduciary responsibilities between partners.9 5 The second method looks to the doctrine of em-

ployment at-will as a rebuttable presumption which can be overcome
if the employee can show that he reasonably relied on a promise of
job security or that job security was implied in fact. 96 The final ap93.

Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 826-27 n.5 (citing Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10

HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).

94. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). Under
the public policy exception, "all employment contracts, whether at-will or for a definite term,
the employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the
interest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two." Monge, 114 N.H. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551. The court
in Monge held, under this public policy exception, that "a termination by the employer of a
contact of employment at-will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a
breach of the employment contract." Id.
95. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976). The Massachusetts' courts have extended the application of an implied duty of good
faith and loyalty to the shareholders of the close corporation, holding that the "stockholders in
the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of
the enterprise that partners owe to one another." Donahue, 367 Mass. at 588, 328 N.E.2d at
515. Stockholders "may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of
their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the corporation." Id. The Wilkes decision
extended this duty to at-will employment relationships in a close corporation when the court
held that the majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to a minority shareholder
when he was voted out of office, and thus prevented from obtaining a return on his investment.
Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 849, 353 N.E.2d at 664. Because the corporation paid out no dividends
and the salaries paid to the board of directors was the only form of compensation, the majority
shareholders breached their duty of good faith and loyalty when they severed the minority
shareholder's employment relationship with the corporation. Id.
96. See Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193. As early as 1895,
when the employment at-will doctrine was adopted, it was afforded "no greater status than
that of a rebuttable presumption." Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 198. An employment at-will relationship will only be created "in the absence of
circumstances showing a different intention." Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446,
457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (quoting Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E.
416, 420 (1895)). To determine if the doctrine of employment at-will was intended, the trier of
fact must look "not [to the parties'] subjective intent, nor [to] 'any single act, phrase or other
expression', but [to] 'the totality of all of these, given the attendant circumstances, the situation of the parties, and the objectives they were striving to attain.'" Id. Unfortunately, the
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proach has created a new common-law tort called "abusive dis-

charge."197 The causes of action present in Ingle's complaint are
structured to encompass these three accepted exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine of other states, and Ingle should have been
afforded the opportunity to have the facts considered before a trier
of fact rather than being summarily dismissed. 8

Ingle's contentions and their relationship to the judicially-created exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine of other states
must be examined. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind the
language of the shareholder's agreement and to analyze the court's

interpretations of provision 7(b) of the shareholder's agreement as it

applies to judicially created exceptions.9" The focal point of the controversy in Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc. is the failure of the
New York Judiciary to recognize the need for exceptions to the doctrine of employment at-will.
A.

The Public Policy Exception

"In many jurisdictions, careful assessments of 'the best inter-

est[s] of the economic system' and the
virtually to re-write the traditional
trine."' 1 0 Public policy "is the principle
tract or private dealing is restricted by

'public good' have led courts
[employment at-will] docunder which freedom of conlaw for the good of the com-

court in Ingle failed to examine the totality of the circumstances and thus did not allow the
plaintiff the opportunity to rebut the presumption of an employment at-will relationship. Ingle,
73 N.Y.2d at 192, 535 N.E.2d at 1315-16, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 775-76 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
97. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959). Abusive or wrongful discharge is not equivalent to "just cause." Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385, 386 (1979). Abusive discharge creates a
cause of action "where the discharge contravenes a clear mandate of public policy." Id. The
latter "limits employer discretion to terminate, by requiring the employer, in all instances, to
proffer a proper reason for dismissal, by forbidding the employer to act arbitrarily or capriciously." Id.; see Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 184, 344 P.2d at 25 (discussing the existence
of a proper claim for wrongful discharge where an at-will employee was terminated for refusing to commit perjury).
98. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 201, 535 N.E.2d at 1321, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting). The dissent in Ingle states that there were triable issues of fact which could support Ingle's claims. Id.
99. See supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
100. Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 824. In Massachusetts and Missouri, the courts have
modified contract law with regard to the employment at-will doctrine by implying "a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing" upon the parties. See Rees v. Bank Bldg and Equip. Corp., 332
F.2d 548, 550 (7th Cir. 1964); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364
N.E.2d 1251 (1974). "[E]ven in New York, courts have interpreted employment contracts to
include an implied covenant of good faith where the compensation due the employee was based
on length of service and the employee was discharged, apparently without cause, prematurely."
Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 825 (citing Zimmer v. Wells Mgt. Corp., 348 F. Supp. 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
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Exceptions have been created to protect employees'

file worker's compensation claims,102 to engage in union acrights 0to
tivity 3 and to perform jury duty. 104 While it may be true that these
cases are supported by mandates of public policy derived directly

from the applicable state statutes and constitutions, it is equally true
that they serve at a minimum to establish the principle that public
policy imposes some limits on unbridled discretion to terminate the
employment of someone hired at-will.' 05
Under the public policy exception, which avoids strict adherence
to the employment at-will doctrine in the face of new needs and concerns, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,' °6 weighed the employee's interest in job security against
the employers' needs to maximize their business potential and then

balanced these competing interests in light of societal needs or what
may be referred to as public policy.' 0 7 The court held that a discharge based on "bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not
101. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. at 186, 344 P.2d at 27 (citing 72 C.J.S. Policy 212).
"Another statement, sometimes referred to as a definition, is that whatever contravenes good
morals or any established interests of society is against public policy." Id.
102. See Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Brown v. Transcon Lines,
284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (allowing a cause of action when defendant violates public
policy by terminating an employee who files a worker's compensation claim).
103. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469 (1940); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Rock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13
Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961) (protecting an employee's right to engage in union activities as long as
their actions conformed with the principles of the National Labor Relations Act and thus
public policy).
104. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (holding that a cause of action exists
when an employer terminates an employee in violation of established public policy which encourages individuals to perform jury duty). Other examples of employer actions which are
violative of public policy include termination for refusing to commit perjury. See Petermann,
174 Cal. App. 2d at 184, 344 P.2d at 25. The termination of employment for refusing to
manipulate pollution control reports also violates public policy. See Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978).
105. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 473, 427 A.2d 385, 387
(1980). The court in Sheets held that an at-will employee stated a redressible cause of action
when he alleged that he was dismissed in retaliation for insisting that the company's products
conform with the standards of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. Id.
106. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
107. Monge, 114 N.H. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551. The court in Monge recognized the
need to change outdated theories to make them applicable to the needs and concerns of the
present society. Id. The Monge court did not extend this exception to the extent that the
Massachusetts Supreme Court did in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. when the Massachusetts court created a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty between shareholders in a
close corporation. Compare Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 842, 353 N.E.2d at 657 with Monge, 114
N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
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[in] the best interest of the economic system or the public good and

constitutes a breach of the employment contract."'" 8
In Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales,0 9 the court failed to examine
the special circumstances involved in the employment relationship to
determine if an exception would be appropriate to support the public
policy surrounding the close corporation. 10 Ingle's sworn statements
that the shareholder's agreement was not intended to give Glamore
the right to buy out Ingle on a whim or without cause in connection
with the circumstances surrounding the business endeavor, provided
sufficient evidence to support the granting of a trial on the facts to
determine if the majority shareholders had acted in bad faith or with
malice."' Ingle's personal liability for the corporation's debts, the
timing of the buy-out and termination, and society's need for economic protection in minority shareholder ownership rights were some
of the factors the court should have examined to gain a full understanding of the plight of this plaintiff and others like him." 2 If the
court considered these special circumstances, a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine could have been created if
the trier of fact found the defendant to have acted in bad faith."'
The Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized, in Wilkes v.
108. Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. The court expressly stated that it would
afford the employer some protection to discharge employees under the business judgment rule
while providing for some degree of stability in employment for the at-will employee. Monge,
114 N.H. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552.
109. 73 N.Y.2d 183, 535 N.E.2d 1311, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1989).
110. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 191, 535 N.E.2d at 1315, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 775 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
11. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 194, 535 N.E.2d at 1318, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 778 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting). New York courts have recognized the special needs of the minority shareholder in
the close corporation in prior cases; however, in Ingle the court seemed to lose sight of these
needs in an attempt to uphold consistent applications of a judicial doctrine. Id.
112. Id.
113. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 201, 535 N.E.2d at 1322, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting). Ingle's discharge was the result of a special meeting held with the purpose of
voting Ingle out of his corporate posts and terminating his position as operating manager of
the corporation by the majority shareholders. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 186, 535 N.E.2d at 1312,
538 N.Y.S.2d at 772. Although the shareholders of a corporation have the right to join together to obtain control of the corporation, which includes having their choice of directors
governing the board of the corporation, directors may not make agreements prior to a vote to
govern how they will vote. McQuade v. Stoneham & McGraw, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234
(1934). The purpose of such a rule is to protect the corporation, for all directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its owners, including minority shareholders, to act in its best
interests. Id. It appears that such an agreement was created in bad faith by Glamore and his
sons prior to that special meeting of May 9, 1983, yet the court refused to afford Ingle the
opportunity to show that bad faith on the part of the defendants existed when the court affirmed the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 201, 535 N.E.2d at
1322, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
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Springside Nursing Home, Inc.," 4 that notions of public policy
which govern these judicially-created exceptions differ between a
typical at-will employee and a party who is a minority shareholder
working under the status of an employee at-will.115 In Wilkes, the
court upheld its prior decision in Donahue"6 that "stockholder[s] in
the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one
another.""' The Massachusetts court recognized that ownership and
employment are interdependent for the shareholder of the close corporation and thus understood that "by terminating a minority shareholder's employment or by severing him from a position as an officer
or director, the majority effectively frustrate[d] the minority stockholder's purpose in entering on the corporate venture and also
den[ied] him an equal return on his investment.""' 8
Some courts, including the New York Court of Appeals in Ingle, have refused to recognize that shareholders of a close corporation bear the "same relation[ship] of trust and confidence which
prevails in partnerships."" 9 "[T]his view ignores the practical realities of the organization and functioning of a small 'two man' corporation organized to carry on a small business enterprise in which the
stockholders, directors, and managers are the same persons." 20 Although the close corporation has the advantages of limited liability
and continuity of life, the close corporation changes neither the operations of the small business enterprise nor the opportunities for oppression of the minority shareholders.
If the courts do not impose a fiduciary duty upon majority
shareholders in a close corporation, the organization gains all of the
114.
115.

370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
See Wilkes, 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).

116. Donahue, 367 Mass. at 578, 328 N.E.2d at 505. The court held that "[w]hen the
corporation reacquiring its own stock is a close corporation, the purchase is subject to the
additional requirement. . . that the stockholders, who, as directors or controlling stockholders,
caused the corporation to enter into the stock purchase agreement, must have acted with the
utmost good faith and loyalty to the other stockholders." Donahue, 367 Mass. at 591, 328
N.E.2d at 518 (emphasis added).
117. Donahue, 367 Mass. at 588, 328 N.E.2d at 515. "Just as in a partnership, the

relationship among the stockholders must be one of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty if the
enterprise is to succeed." Donahue, 367 Mass. at 585, 328 N.E.2d at 512.
118. Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 847, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63. Similar to Ingle's case, Wilkes
was terminated not for "misconduct or neglect of duties" but because of the defendants' self
serving desire to prevent the plaintiff from receiving corporate monies. Wilkes, 370 Mass. at

846, 353 N.E.2d at 661.
119. Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 513 (citing Helms v. Duckworth, 249
F.2d 482, 486 (1957)).
120. Id.
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benefits of the corporate form without any of the burdens.12 1 For
example, in a publicly-owned corporation the market controls the actions of the directors and controlling shareholders, but the minority
shareholder of the close corporation lacks this protection because
there is typically no market for the corporate stock.'2 2 In some instances, when the market is determined to be an ineffective means of
control, the courts have imposed limitations on the rights of directors
and controlling shareholders when their actions hinder the corporation itself or its minority shareholders. 2 ' The court in Ingle did not
even grant the plaintiff the opportunity to present the facts of the
case to determine if the corporation's attributes were similar to that
of a partnership, in which an imposition of a duty of good faith and
loyalty would be appropriate to support public policy.' 24
B. Rebuttable Presumption
Another approach which has been used to lessen the sting of the
employment at-will doctrine has been to make the doctrine of employment at-will a mere presumption which can be rebutted by evidence of intentions to the contrary.' 2 5 Under the rebuttable presumption exception, "the trier of the facts will have to consider the
'course of conduct' of the parties, 'including their writings' and their
antecedent negotiations.' 2 6 This approach is similar to the approach
used in the public policy exception, to determine if the presumption
of at-will status has been overcome. 21 In order to overcome the pre121. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 201, 535 N.E.2d at 1321, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
122. Id.
123. There are many examples of judicial limitations on the rights of directors and controlling shareholders to act in their best interests. Although in general, controlling shareholders

have a fundamental right to sell their shares at a profit, this right is limited when the shareholder knew or should have known that the buyer intended to loot the company's assets. See
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1941). A shareholder's right to receive a premium on

the sale of his shares is not absolute and becomes a breach of a fiduciary duty if the sale is
solely for a corporate post. See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
Another breach of fiduciary duty involves self-dealing transactions in which the director or
controlling shareholder must show that the transaction was intrinsically fair to the corporation
to be valid. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
124. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 199, 535 N.E.2d at 1320, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (Hancock, J.,

dissenting).
125. Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 466, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (citing Martin
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 420 (1895)).
126. Id. (citing Brown Bros. Elec. Contrs. V. Beame Constr. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 397, 399,
361 N.E.2d 999, 1001, 393 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 (1977)). The parties' subjective intents do not

control the determination and neither does "any single act, phrase or other expression." Brown
Bros. Elec. Constr., 41 N.Y.2d at 400, 361 N.E.2d at 1002, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
127. Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 466, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198. The court
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sumption of an employment at-will relationship, the parties must
prove that a contractual relationship was consummated based on
mutual promises. 128 This exemption from the absolute rule of employment at-will focuses on the "realization of [the parties] expectations"' 2 9 and the determination of their reasonableness.

30

When the

conflict involves the at-will status of an employee, the court can hold
that the employer had an implied duty to discharge only for good

cause and hence be able to protect the employee's reliance
interests.'l 3
The New York Court of Appeals undertook this approach in
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,"3 2 holding that the employment relationship was not governed by the doctrine of employment at-will be-

cause the plaintiff had reasonably relied on oral and written statements which implied that the employee would only be discharged for
cause.' 3 3 However, the court in Ingle refused to extend this principle
to protect minority shareholders in close corporations who are subject to even greater harm than a typical employee at-will because of
the minority shareholders' personal investment and lack of
considers the entire situation including but not limited to "attendant circumstances, the situation of the parties, and the objectives they were striving to attain" to determine if the doctrine
is rebutted. Id.
128. Minda, The Common Law of Employment At-Will in New York. The Paralysisof
Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 939, 994 (1985). In Weiner, the court
held that the plaintiff sustained his burden of proof to overcome the presumption of an at-will
employment relationship through emphasizing "reasonable expectations" rather than "formalistic claims of indefiniteness and lack of mirror image acceptance." Minda, supra note 128, at
994. See Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 458, 443 N.E.2d at 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 193. The court
recognized that "the fact that plaintiff was free to quit his employment at-will," was not conclusive in and of itself. Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
The court emphasized that the search for mutuality "is not necessary when a promisor receives
other valid consideration." Id. To satisfy the consideration requirement, "[i]t is enough that
something is promised, done, forborne or suffered by the party to whom the promise is made as
consideration for the promise made to him." Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444,
457 N.Y.S.2d at 196 (citing Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891)).
129. Brown Bros. Elec. Constr., 41 N.Y.2d at 400, 361 N.E.2d at 1001, 393 N.Y.S.2d
at 352.
130. Id. "The courts must imply terms in contracts in order to secure the contractual
expectations of the parties." Minda, supra note 128, at 994 (interpreting Brown Bros. Elec.
Constr., 41 N.Y.2d at 400, 361 N.E.2d at 1001, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 352).
131. Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 466, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
132. 57 N.Y.2d at 458, 443 N.E.2d at 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
133. Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 466, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The breach of
contract claim in Weiner was intended to compensate the plaintiff for actions commenced and
opportunities lost due to the defendant's assertions. Id. The courts must protect individuals
who reasonably rely on other individuals' promises, even when the promise was not explicit but
was implied from the surrounding circumstances. Id. See Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon, 22 N.Y.
88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917) (discussing the implied "best efforts" clause in an agency
relationship).
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mobility.134
As stated by Justice Hancock in his dissent in Ingle, "[t]he need
for special protection of a minority shareholder could not be better
illustrated than in the case at bar.'13 5 To treat plaintiff's position in
Glamore Motor Sales as though it entailed the same freedom to
leave as that of mid-level employees in Murphy,136 Weiner, a1 and
Sabetay 38 is to ignore the substantially different factors between Ingle as a shareholder/employee and the ordinary employee.13 9 It is
the personal investments, lack of dividends, and lack of market for
the close corporation stock which significantly curtail the minority
shareholder's freedom. 4 '
Oppression of a minority shareholder has been defined to include "conduct that substantially defeats the 'reasonable expectations' held by minority shareholders in committing their capital to
the particular enterprise."' 4 ' "[S]hareholder[s] who reasonably expect ownership in the corporation [to] entitle [them] to a job, a
share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or
some other form of security, would be oppressed in a very real sense
when others in the corporation seek to defeat those expectations." 42
The court in Ingle failed to fully examine the circumstances
surrounding the employment relationship of the minority shareholder
of the close corporation to determine if the presumption of an at-will
employment relationship could have been rebutted through Ingle's
134. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 192, 535 N.E.2d at 1319, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 779 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
135. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 191, 535 N.E.2d at 1319, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 779 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
136. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
137. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
138. 69 N.Y.2d 329, 506 N.E.2d 919, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1987).
139. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 193, 535 N.E.2d at 1321, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
140. Id.
[W]hether it be lack of mutuality or lack of consideration, the rationale for the
employment at-will rule does not fit the situation of the minority shareholder-participant in a close corporation. For such participant is not truly free to quit at any
time; and there is consideration which would support an implied understanding
that, at least, the majority owner will not discharge him arbitrarily or in bad faith
and without some legitimate business reason.
Id. (emphasis in original).
141. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 73, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179, 484
N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (1984).
142. In re Kemp & Beatley Inc., 64 N.Y.2d at 72-73, 473 N.E.2d at 1179, 484
N.Y.S.2d at 805. In In re Kemp & Beatley Inc., the plaintiff requested the involuntary dissolution of the corporation when minority shareholders were oppressed in a squeeze out at the
hands of the majority shareholders. 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799.
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reasonable reliance on the existence of job security as a co-owner.14 a
The majority viewed the shareholders' agreement as conclusive evidence of an at-will employment relationship."" However, as noted in
the dissenting opinion, a variety of sworn statements by Ingle alleged
that he had reasonably relied on the defendant's implied promises
that discharge would be for cause and not on a whim or in bad faith.
The agreement between the two co-owners, Glamore and Ingle, and
the Ford Corporation stating that Ingle and Glamore would operate
the dealership as joint owners, each with full authority and responsibility for the operations of the business enterprise, support Ingle's
contentions of reasonable reliance on job security .145 In addition, Ingle's actions to personally guarantee the corporation's liabilities constitute consideration for the promise to act as co-dealers and rebuts
the presumption of employment at-will under the majority's interpretation of the shareholders' agreement. 4
As the majority emphasizes, Ingle was compensated for the sale
of his shares, but to believe that the dollar amount received met his
expectations would be to dismiss his purpose in acquiring those
shares. 47 Ingle had reasonably expected his employment to continue
until he chose to retire or to acquire his own Ford dealership at
which time Glamore would be able to use the repurchase agreement.' 48 A more fact sensitive interpretation of paragraph 7(b) of
the shareholders' agreement, considering the attendant circumstances, would have rebutted the presumption of an indefinite employment relationship and would have been afforded the plaintiff
protection against oppression by majority shareholders.
143. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 189, 535 N.E.2d at 1317, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
144. See supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of paragraph 7(b) of the shareholders' agreement).
145. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 188-89, 535 N.E.2d at 1316-17, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77
(Hancock, J., dissenting). The court in Weiner allowed the employees' policy manuals to be
used to rebut the presumption of employment at-will. Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d
at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
146. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 188-89, 535 N.E.2d at 1316-17, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77
(Hancock, J., dissenting).
147.

Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 183, 535 N.E.2d at 1311, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 771.

148. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 189, 535 N.E.2d at 1317, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting). Ingle explained that "the purpose and intent of paragraph 7(b) was to protect
James Glamore in case [the] plaintiff chose to leave the business, not to give Glamore the
right at any time, for any reason or for no reason to deprive plaintiff of all expectancies as co-

principal in the agency." Id.
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C. Abusive Discharge

The final approach to ease the inherent problems of the doctrine
of employment at-will is the creation of the abusive discharge limitation. "While no case in New York has yet recognized the tort of
abusive discharge, precedent does suggest New York courts will do
so when presented with the proper case.' 1 49 "The doctrine of abusive
discharge places upon the plaintiff the burden of persuading [the]
court that (1) there is a public policy of this State that (2) was violated by the defendant.' 5 0
The United States District Court recognized abusive discharge
as a proper cause of action, stating that "[c]ourts cannot hide in
ivory towers ignoring the economic and social realities of modern society." 5 ' In Savodnik,152 the plaintiff sustained his burden of proof
when he alleged that he was a model employee, and that the purpose
of his termination was "solely to deprive him of his pension benefits."' 53 Under the assumption that the plaintiff's allegations were
true, the court held that, under the state constitution and ERISA, I4
the defendant had "clearly violated New York's policy favoring the
integrity of pension plans to protect the interests of the participants
in such plans.' 55 The United States District Court for the Eastern
149. Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 826 (quoting Chin v. American Tel. & Tel., 96 Misc. 2d
1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y.Co. 1978), afid, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dept.
1979)). The court in Chin stated in dicta that "this court is not adverse to recognizing new
causes of action. . . where clearly warranted." Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 826 (quoting Chin,
96 Misc. 2d at 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741. "The motion to dismiss in Chin was thus granted
not because the New York Supreme Court was unwilling to embrace the theory of abusive
discharge, but rather, because 'plaintiff ha[d] not sustained his burden of persuasion.'" Id.
150. Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 826 (quoting Chin, 96 Misc. 2d at 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d
at 741). The United States District Court of the Eastern District of New York refused to
dismiss the plaintiff's claim for abusive discharge holding that the defendant clearly violated
New York's public policy "favoring the protection of the integrity of pension plans." Savodnik,
488 F. Supp. at 826.
151. Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 826. The court views its role in society protecting these
changing needs and as serving the society by adopting exceptions to ancient rules to conform
to new notions of public policy. Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 826-27.
152. 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
153. Id. at 826. The court stated that the plaintiff successfully met his burden of persuasion when the defendant did not rebut these allegations. Id. The court permitted a claim
against the defendant, even though under the strict doctrine of employment at-will the defendant would be allowed to dismiss the plaintiff in bad faith and would not be required to repudiate these allegations. Id.
154. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 898 (codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1114).
155. Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 826. The court noted that the "[e]nactment of ERISA
itself testifies to the great significance income security has for the millions of the country's
retired population." Id.
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District of New York felt convinced that "New York courts would
56
recognize the abusive discharge doctrine on the facts of this case."'
In 1983, the New York court explicitly stated its disapproval of
the creation of the abusive discharge claim in the context of an employment at-will relationship. 157 The court's refusal to adopt the abusive discharge doctrine stemmed from its reluctance to "alter [its]
long settled-rule that where an employment is for an indefinite term
it is presumed to be a hiring at will which may be freely terminated
by either party at any time for any reason or even for no reason.
In Murphy, the court refused to disrupt the strict application of the
doctrine of employment at-will and was of the opinion that a claim
based on wrongful termination was an attempt "to subvert the traditional at-will contract rule by casting [the] cause of action in terms
of a tort [action]."159
The dissent in Murphy emphasized that the doctrine of employment at-will was a judicially-created doctrine and hence can be modified by the judiciary. 6 0 The dissenters in Murphy also remark that
the doctrine of employment at-will "has for at least a century been
subject to the 'universal force' of the good faith rule,"'' and there62
fore the legislature, prior to this decision, had no reason to act.
With regard to the plight of the minority shareholder in the
close corporation, the New York Legislature did act to afford the
minority shareholder protection from oppression by the majority
shareholders. 6 Ingle could have had a successful claim under a theory of wrongful discharge as pronounced by the United States Dis156.

Id. at 827. The court based its decision heavily on the decision and accompanying

dicta in Chin and its opinion of the "recent developments in the evolution of the 'wrongful
firing'" exception. Id.

157. See Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 293, 448 N.E.2d at 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
158. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 300, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
159. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The court
dismissed the claim holding that it is the role of the legislature to make reforms to meet the
current expectations of public policy. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 300, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461

N.Y.S.2d at 235.
160.

Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 314, 448 N.E.2d at 97, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 243 (Meyer, J.,

dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. The dissenting opinion states that there is "no compelling policy reason to read
the implied obligation of good faith out of contracts impliedly terminable at will." Murphy, 58
N.Y.2d at 313, 448 N.E.2d at 96, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 242 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (discussing

Section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts which imposes an obligation upon the parties in
all contracts to act under a "duty of good faith and fair dealing").

163. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 197, 535 N.E.2d at 1319, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 779 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting) (discussing Sections 1104-a and 1118 of the Business Corporation Law and how
the legislative enactment can be used to protect minority shareholders); see infra notes 168-81

and accompanying text.
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trict Court in Savodnik,"' but the majority in Ingle dismissed the
claim against Glamore and his sons "for wrongfully inducing the
corporation to terminate [the] plaintiff as officer, director and employee,"'165 without considering the special circumstances of the minority shareholder under the theory of employment at-will.' 6 6 As
stated in the dissenting opinion in Ingle, "[b]y treating the essence
of plaintiff's complaints as a claimed breach of a hiring contract by
the employer rather than an unfair squeeze-out of a minority shareholder in a close corporation by the majority, the court simply concludes that plaintiff has no rights at all.' 6 7
V.

SQUEEZE OUT OF THE MINORITY SHAREHOLDER

In Ingle, Justice Hancock, in his dissenting opinion, states that
164. See Savodnik, 488 F. Supp. at 822. Ingle proved that the defendant violated a
public policy encompassed in a statutory pronouncement in Sections 1104-a and 1118 of the
Business Corporation Law of New York. 73 N.Y.2d at 197, 535 N.E.2d at 1319, 538
N.Y.S.2d at 779 (Hancock, J., dissenting); see supra note 175 (for text of § 1104-a). Section
1104-a of the Business Corporation Law is evidence of New York's public policy to recognize
the minority shareholders' expectation in job security. Thus Glamore's action to have Ingle
ousted from the corporation for the sole reason of attaining the defendants' selfish ends in the
absence of an economic justification would sustain the plaintiff's claim under a theory of abusive discharge similar to the cause of action in Savodnik. Compare Ingle v. Glamore Motor
Sales, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 183, 535 N.E.2d 1311, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1989) with Savodnik v.
Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
165. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 191, 535 N.E.2d at 1315, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 775 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
166. Id. The court essentially disregards the factors which could provide guidelines to
establish appropriate exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine under the tort cause of
action known as abusive discharge. See Minda, The Common Law of Employment At-Will in
New York: The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUsE L. REv. 939, 956
(1985). "According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the concept of privilege is defined
as a justification for removing liability for intentional interferences with prospective contractual relations." Id.
Privilege is defined in terms of the following seven factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interest sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.
Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 767 (1979). "As at least one court has pointed out,
the first five of these factors are substantially identical to the factors that would be weighed in
determining if the employer has justification for discharging an at-will employee [or acted in a
manner violative of the abusive discharge exception as constructed in Savodnik]." Minda,
supra note 14, at 956-57.
167. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 190, 535 N.E.2d at 1315, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 775 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
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the majority opinion extended the doctrine of employment at-will to
a situation which "it was never intended to cover."' 16 8 The dissent

explained that "the relationship of a minority shareholder to a close
corporation, if fairly viewed, cannot possibly be equated with an ordinary hiring and, in the absence of a contract, regarded as nothing

more than an employment at-will.'

69

However, this is the course

taken by the majority of the court when they refuse to "address the

multiple relationships and the expectancies and vulnerabilities peculiar to the status of a minority shareholder in [the] plaintiff's position-those very considerations which call for the relief that only a
court of equity can give."' 70 According to the dissent, the plaintiff's
claim is simply "one of an abuse of corporate power by the majority
resulting in an unlawful squeeze-out of a minority shareholder.'1'
In asserting a claim of an unlawful squeeze-out of a minority
shareholder by the majority, the court seeks to protect the plaintiff's
special situation in a manner that resembles all three of the exceptions to the doctrine of employment at-will." 2 "A 'squeeze-out' has
been defined as the controlling shareholders' use of their preeminent
position in the business to drive out other less powerful participants
in the business."' 17 Under Section 1104-a of the Business Corporation Law, the legislature has provided a "mechanism for the holders
of at least 20% of the outstanding shares of a corporation whose
stock is not traded on a securities market to petition for [the corpo168. Id. at 199, 535 N.E.2d at 1320, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (Hancock, J.,dissenting).
"By simply considering the case as one at law for breach of contract, the majority makes
defendants impervious to suit by placing them under the protective mantel of the Sabetay,
Murphy, Weiner, and Martin rule." Id. In these cases, the defendants had the absolute and
unfettered right to discharge at-will under the mutuality of obligation which stated "if the
employee can quit his job at-will, then so, too, must the employer have the right to terminate
the relationship for any reason or no reason." Blades, supra note 9, at 1419. See Minda, supra
note 14, at 975-78.
169. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 199, 535 N.E.2d at 1320, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting). The underlying purpose of the employment at-will rule does not adapt to the situation when the conflict involves parties in a closely held corporation because the minority shareholders are "not truly free to quit at any time," and thus consideration is given which would
support termination for cause rather than at-will. Id. at 200, 535 N.E.2d at 1321, 538
N.Y.S.2d at 781 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
170. Id. at 199, 535 N.E.2d at 1320, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (Hancock, J., dissenting). In
general, minority shareholders invest a substantial amount of their assets in the corporation in
the anticipation of continuing employment and receiving what is usually their sole source of
income and their only investment scheme. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d at 71, 473
N.E.2d at 1178, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
171. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 193, 535 N.E.2d at 1316, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Comment, supra note 17, at 596.
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ration's] dissolution"' 174 when the controlling shareholders are (1)

acting in a manner that is illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive towards
the minority shareholders; or (2) misappropriating corporate
assets. 175

In regard to Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc, the issue is
whether the majority's behavior can be deemed as being oppressive
towards Ingle as a minority shareholder. Oppressive behavior is generally defined as "conduct that substantially defeats the 'reasonable
expectations' held by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular enterprise."' 76 This claim is "[p]redicated on the
majority shareholders' fiduciary obligation to treat all shareholders
fairly and equally, to preserve corporate assets, and to fulfill their
responsibilities of corporate management with 'scrupulous good
faith.' "'177 "hus, minority shareholders are afforded an opportunity
174. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d at 70-71, 473 N.E.2d at 1177-78, 484
N.Y.S.2d at 803-04.
175. Id. Section 1104-a of New York Business Corporation Law provides for the petition for judicial dissolution under special circumstances:
(a) The holders of twenty percent or more of all outstanding shares of a corporation, other
than a corporation registered as an investment company under an act of congress entitled
'Investment Company Act of 1940,' no shares of which are listed on a national securities
exchange or regularly in an over-the-counter market by one or more members of a national
or
an affiliated securities association, who are entitled to vote in an election of directors
may
present a petition of dissolution on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) The directors or those in control of the corporation have been guilty of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions toward the complaining shareholders;
(2) The property or assets of the corporation are being looted, wasted, or diversified for
noncorporate purposes by its directors, officers or those in control of the corporation.
(b) The court, in determining whether to proceed with involuntary dissolution pursuant
to
this section, shall take into account:
(1) Whether liquidation of the corporation is the only feasible means whereby the petitioners may reasonably expect to obtain a fair return on their investment; and
(2) Whether liquidation of the corporation is reasonably necessary for the protection of
the rights and interests of any substantial number of shareholders or of the petitioners.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104-a; In re Kemp & Beatley Inc., 64 N.Y.2d at 70-71, 473 N.E.2d
at 1177-78, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 803-04 n.l (citing Section 1104-a of Business Corporation Law).
176. In re Kemp & Beatley Inc., 64 N.Y.2d at 73, 473 N.E.2d at 1180, 484 N.Y.S.2d at
805. To determine what constitutes oppression, it is useful to understand the legislature's
purpose in enacting the statute. Id. at 71, 473 N.E.2d at 1178, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 804. The legislature wanted to protect the minority shareholders' reasonable expectations involving an
equal
and fair return on their investment and their expectation that they will be "actively involved
in
[the corporation's] management and operation." Id.
A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would
entitle him or her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other form of security, would be oppressed in a very real sense
when others in the corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there exists no
effective means of salvaging the investment.
Id. at 72-73, 473 N.E.2d at 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
177. Id., 64 N.Y. 2d at 69, 473 N.E.2d at 1177, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 803. When the major-
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to be heard because there is an appropriate cause of action which

considers their special circumstances. The minority shareholder exhibits a proper claim through evidence that the majority shareholders' conduct "substantially defeat[ed] [the] expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and
78
were central to the petitioner's decision to join the venture."'

In 1979, the legislature created Section 1104-a to address the
power conflicts that can arise in the context of a closely held corpo-

ration.17 9 However, the court in Ingle did not recognize this statute
as a means of redress nor as a legislative grant of authority to circumvent the problems of the doctrine of employment at-will in its
application to the minority shareholder/employee in the close corporation.'1 0 Ingle held over twenty percent of the corporation's stock

and, in light of the actions of Ingle and Glamore in their business
relationship which extended for almost twenty years, his expectation
of job security was reasonable and central to his investing in the
corporation.'' The defendants breached their duty of good faith and
fair dealing when they terminated Ingle's employment and repurchased his shares without cause. Yet the New York court was still
unwilling to tamper with the doctrine of employment at-will even

with the existence of Section 1104-a of the New York Business Corporation Law.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although the New York courts have expressed a desire to lessen
82
the burdens of the doctrine of employment at-will,' they consistity breaches their fiduciary duty, the minority can seek redress through the court of equity on
statutory grounds for dissolution. Id.
178. Id. at 72, 473 N.E.2d at 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 805 (discussing the determination
of oppression as being a fact sensitive process). It is important to note that the court can
determine that oppression resulted from the frustration of the minority shareholder's reasonable expectations which the majority either knew or should have known existed. Id.
179. In re Pace Photographers, 71 N.Y.2d 737, 743, 525 N.E.2d 713, 716, 530
N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (1988). "Prior to 1979, minority shareholders in close corporations who suffered abuse at the hands of the majority lacked the options available to business partners and
shareholders in public corporations to extricate the value of their investments." Id.
180. Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 195-201, 535 N.E.2d at 1318-21, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 778-81.
(Hancock, J., dissenting).
181. Id. Glamore knew or should have known that Ingle expected to remain an active
member of the corporation until he choose to leave or behaved in a manner that did not conform with the agreement as co-owners each with full authority and responsibility for the operations of the dealership. Id.
182. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York has shown its desire for
change. See Fender v. Prescott, 101 A.D.2d 418, 476 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 1984); Pernet
v. Peabody Eng'g Corp., 20 A.D.2d 781, 248 N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Div. 1964). "Implicit in the
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ently decline to do so when presented with the opportunity. In Ingle
v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., the court continued to place the burden of reform on the legislature, but as noted in the dissenting opinion, the legislature did indeed act.'83 In 1979, the legislature enacted
sections 1104-a and 1118 of the Business Corporation Law to explicitly provide protection for a plaintiff in Ingle's predicament, but it
was overlooked by the majority of justices in the Ingle court when
they once again conformed to the steadfast doctrine of employment
at-will.
Other states have made exceptions which focus on (1) the public policies governing society as related to the doctrine of employment at-will; (2) the doctrine as a mere presumption which can be
rebutted; and (3) the doctrine as a means to justify an abusive discharge. All of these exceptions attempt to adapt the doctrine to present societal needs and interests. The law must change with the
times and cannot remain static in the face of controversies which are
the result of outdated thoughts. It is the role of the court to afford
the injured with a means of redress and not to encourage oppression
created by legal doctrines. The employment at-will doctrine was judicially created and must be modified in the same manner to protect
the interests which are presently endangered.
Alyse J. Ferraro

agreements between the parties, as is generally the case in all contracts, there existed
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Pernet, 20 A.D.2d at 784, 248 N.Y.S.2d
at 135.

"[T]he relationship between shareholders in a close corporation, viz-a-viz each other, is akin
to

that between partners and imposes a high degree of fidelity and good faith." Fender,
101
A.D.2d at 422, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 132 (citing In re T.J. Ronan Paint Corp. [Doran],
98 A.D.2d
413, 469 N.Y.S.2d 931). As stated by Chief Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon,
"[a]
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."
Fender, 101
A.D.2d at 422, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 132 (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458,
464, 164
N.E. 546).

183. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
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